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The motor vehicle-train accident, though infrequent, Is the mcsc
severe in tezni3 of fatalities, personal injuries and property cat^age per

accident of all types experienced on American highways.

This type of

accident, however, can be eliminated only by closing all crossings to

highway traffic or by constructing grade separations for all rail-highway
crossings.

The delay and congestion resulting from the first alternative

obviously would not be tolerated by the motoring public.

Based on an

estimated cost of separation improvements in Ohio, it would cost $5 billion
to construct grade separations 3t the 10,800 grade crossings in the State of

Indiana. (4)

Another alternative i3 to Install modern flashing lights with shortSuch an undertaking is estimated to reduce

srm gates at all crossings.

the number of accidents by a considerable amount, but the cost would be
in excess of $150 million.

(4)

This figure is more realistic but still

represents an enormous sum of money.

Furthermore, the expenditure of this

amount of money might well be more efficiently used for the pravention of

other types of accidents.

during 1962 and 1963, 149 people were killed in motor vehicle- train
accidents in Indiana.

This figure accounts for 6.0 percent of the total

highway fatalities but only 0.4 percent of the total number of accidents.
{1)

The severity ox these accidents is of general concern to the public

and is invariably well publicized.

lumbers in parentheses refer

to sources listed in the Bibliography.
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The national trend for roii-highway 3rade crossing accidents is

decreasing, but the reverse is true in Indiana.

Sased en data ccaipiied

by the Interstate Corceerce Commission at the close of 1553, the nciiber3

of grade crossing accidents and fatalities in Indiana were among the

highest in the nation.

Indiana was exceeded only by the State of Arkaasa:

in grade crossing accidents per million cai'3 registered and grade cross-

ing deaths per million cars registered. (4)

The present warrants as specified by the Indiana State Highway Com-

mission for the protection of highway- rail grade cro33lngs are as follows
a)

"Two or more main

livse

tracks should be protected by fiashiag

lights and short-arm gates
b)

Where train speeds are 70 cph or greater on single line traclcs,
flashing lights and short-arm gates should be used i and

c)

All other crossings are protacted by flashing lights escept
those where there is good sight distance in all quadrants and

where either the highway traffic is less than 500 vehicles per
day (ADT), or rail traffic less than 6 trains per day

iTSD'i*

These latter crossings are protected by reflectorised crossbucks
and edvance warning signs." {3}
These general warrants do not result in priority ratings based on hazard.
Ihe priority for improving crossing protection at rail-highway intersec-

tions is left to subjective judgment.
In a recent report by the Interstate Co>Tsaerca Commission based on

data submitted by the railroads, Henry Vinskay concluded that the major

causa of rail-highway grade crossing accidents is the fsilura of motcr-cahicle drivers to yield to trains,
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(2J

Xfas

purpose of Shis research

study va3 to investigate existing cocdisiona which uight havy encouraged

drivers not to take reasonable precautions.

rhi3 utudy constitutea an

analysis of highway-rail gride crossing accidents with respeci to the

affects of environment, crossing geometry, highway and rail traffic

patterns, existing protective devices, and other relevant elements and
their relative importance as a basis for dateraining

a izore

effective

and economic ceans of establishing the necessary railroad crossing

protection.

(5)
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Secause accident data sera readily available for only two years,
1962 and 1963, and so that mora meaningful correlations could be developed,

accident locations were compared to non-accident locations.

Tha 239 acci-

dent locations, which included most of the rural crossings in Indiana with
aC leaat one accident in 1962 and 1963, were established by using the

traffic accident reports of the Indiana State Police,

The 241 non- acci-

dent locations were randomly selected throughout the State in proportion
to the railroad mileage in each county.

The information for the study variables came primarily frca three
separate source ss

police accident reports; field investigations 5 and

A total of 28 variables was considered in

railroad correspondence.

evaluating the effects of environment, topography, geccaetry, and highway
and railroad traffic patterns on the safety of rail-highway grade

Only those variables which significantly

crossings in rural areas.

influenced the hazard of grade crossings are presented in the Results
section.

Multiple linear regression analysis was performed on the 28 variables
ccsooa to both accident and ncn-accidenc locations.
was accident occurrence,

a

The dependent variable

dichotcaou3 variable representing occurrence

or nca- occurrence of an accident.

The "buildup" regression routine

allowed the ordering of the independent variables to permit the initial
inclusion of preselected variables.

?or all equations, train and highway

traffic volumes were orderad to permit their inclusion in the aultipla

regression expressions.
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la an actsrpt to gain an in3igh£

in'.o

the characteristics of

railroad-highway grade crossing accidents, the following statistical
snranary was developed frota the accident locations analyzed in this

rs search investigation.
1

Driver characteristics.
So

Driver age

-

the average age of all drivers involved in a

grade crossing accident was 36 years,
86 percent of these drivers were sals.

b*

Driver sex

c.

Driver residence

-

72 percent of the drivers were froo the

-

county in which the accident occurred.

Binary- four percent

of the drivers were residents of the State of Indiana,
d.

Nuabar of occupants

the average number of occupants in

-

accident vehicles was 1.36 persons per vehicle,
e.

Drinking driver

-

only

si::

percent of the accident reports

indicated that the driver had been drinking.
f.

Personal injury

-

62 percent of the accidents resulted in

at least one personal injury.
g.

Fatality

percent of the accidents resulted in at least

- 14

cne fatality.
2.

7ehicle characteristics.

a.

Vehicle type

-

27 percent of the accident vehicles Tiere

trucks.
b.

Age of vehicle

- the

average age of vehicles invclvad in

grade crossing accidents vaa 5.2 years
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c„

Vehicle defects

17 percent oi the accidect vehicles

-

evidenced contributing mechanical defect3,
d»

Window position

71 percent: of the vehiclas were considered

-

to have had their windowa rolled up ct the tine of the

accident.
e.

Actual car 9peed

-

the average of

tliiz

reported cer 3peeds

of vehicles involved in accidents was 24 mph.
f.

Actual train speed

-

the average of the reported speeds

of trains involved in accidents was 41
3„

icph..

Environmental characteristics.
a.

Clear weather

-

74 percent of the accidents occurred curing

clear weather.
36 parceat of the accidents occurred at night.

b.

Darkness

c.

Pavement surface aoisture

-

-

pavements were dry 57 percent,

wet 16 percent, and had ice or snew 27 percent of the tine
that accidents occurred.
d.

Day of the week

-

accident occurrence by day of ths week i3

suaansrixed below;

Monday
.l*v

14.27,

14-5%

11.8%

Thursday

15.6%

Friday

16,3%

Saturday

15 «o»

Sunday

11,3%

1S2

An equation wa3 developed to account for rho various protection devices, train and highway volumes and those jddi'cicaal variable* which

significantly influenced accident occurrence.

This analysis produced the

following prediction equation:
1.

XH

+0.149 -0.376X„ o -0.300X„ n -0.333X,, -0.331X„ o +0.G322,,,
30

29

31

32

"4U

+0.0223X., +0,0112.. +0.01422.. +0.024X C _,
41
54
j3
57
» index of hazard (accident occurrence),

where 2H
X_ q

presence of a painted crossbuck ^0, 1),

X_-

presence of a reflectorised crossbuck (0, 1),

X-.

presence of

X- 2

presence of a gata (0, 1),

X&0

number of track pairs,

X

.

a

» pavement width ia feet,

X^

» TPD,

X

- AET/1000, and

5S

flasher {0, 1),

X__ - sum of distractions.
In addition to the protection variables, Equation

1

also includes

variables which are measures of train and highway volumes.

The type of

rail and highway operations is represented by the variables designated

a3 number of track pairs and pavement width.

distractions vhich is tha

sxsa

The number of roadside

of the houses, businesses, and advertising

sign3 par one-half oils on both sides of the roadway for one approach to the

crossing, proved significant in this equation.

determination for Equation

1

was 19.3 percent.
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The coefficient of

3

The regression coefficients of tha four protective devices were
It mighc be infarrad from this fact that hazard was

remar'.cably similar.

relatively independent of the type of protective devica,

To ascertain

the 3tati3tical significance or the coefficients for the protection

variables, a second multiple regression equation was developed which

excluded the four types of crossing protection and included the rarninThe coefficient of determination for Equation 2,

in3 variables.

presented below, was 18.3 percent.
2.

+ 0.02 IX., + 0.011X.. + 0.01 3I-- + 0.024X,,

HI - 0.185

+

where IH

index of hasard,

0.079X,

.

40

41

j4

55

57

number of track pairs,

X, -

40

2;.. = pavement width in feet,

X

X

54
55

X__

- TPD,
- ADT/1000, and
=»

sum of distractions.

An F-test was performed on the multiple coefficients of
determination for Equations

1

and 2 to test the hypothesis that the

regression coefficients for the four protective devices as presented
in Equation 2 were not significantly different from zero.

This hypothesis

wa3 not rejected at the 5-percent level of significance.
This analysis did not shew that pro taction devices had a signifi£ant

influence on the prediction of hazard at grade crossings.

Although the

protection device variables can be eliminated from the prediction equation,
the result of thi3 significance ta3t dees cot warrant the conclusion that

protection devices have no influence on reducing hazard.
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This finding

is restricted by the limited variability of the field conditions for

the four types of protscticn investigated.

A3 an ezasiple, all high- vol

roads :*cra generally protected with flashers or gates,

roads were protected primarily with crosscuck3.

uzxl

all

lcr»-7ol'.

Perhaps a befors-and-aftar

study at locations where changes in protection devices are made is necessary for such evaluation.

Because the inclusion of the protection variables did not materially
iaiprove the estimation of hazard and because the types of protection device

were equally weighted, the nomograph shown as Pigrire
Equation 2.

1

was dovelcped froa

In an attempt to correlate the lndes of hazard with the

present standards of installing protection devices at grade crossings
in Indiana, the tsean indices of hazard were calculated for Che study

crossings protected with refleetorized cro3sbuc'xs, flashers

,

and gates.

These mean valoes were, respectively, 0.523, 0.774, and 0.323.

A suggested

warrant for the selection of at-grada protection was determined by computing
the average value between the mean inda:: of hazard for the various protacticn

devices.

Flashers wculd be warranted if the index of hazard is greater

than 0.55, 2nd gates would be racoooeuded for indices greater than 0.80.

The valuso ffu££Rstc£ for thsae warrants are based on current levels of
protection,
all crossfcoc
auray pslsjted

riilateu eross&eelga vera not included in the sccograph because
ST*

\m

.

required zo ba re fleeter lead by j^ata lew.

tsbneka ara presently in ;jcrvics,

i.h«se

replaced with refleetorized cross bucks when necessary.
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Althoogi

devices are to

"j«
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The Index of hazard and mlnlaua protection warranted for the exscpia
shown on Figure 1 la determined in the following manner;

Givecs

T?D « 6; ALT

=»

4000; 2 track pairs; 20- ft paversct width; and

10 roadside distractions.
1.

Draw a line extending from 6 trains per day through A/1000 ADT
to turning line A.

2*

From the intersection point en line A, a line is drawn through
2

3.

track pairs and extended to turning line B.

From this point of intersection, a line

is

drawn through 20- ft

pavement width and extended until it intersects turning line C.
4.

After connecting this point on line C to the 10 roadside distractions, the index of hazard and minimum type of protection war-

ranted is found at the intersection of this line with the index

of hazard scale.

4S7
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ccsdusicns
The following conclusions concerning hazard at ra ilroad-bijirjay gr:de
crossings summarize the findings of chis research investigation.

As

actual accident locations were ccopared to a rcndom sample of non-accident locations, these results can reasonably be applied to all rural
grade crossings within the State of Indiana.
1.

The accident victims are predominantly young male drivers

residing in the county in tfbich the accident occurred.

They

are usually traveling alone and cot under the influence of
alcohol.

More than one half of them are injured, and about one

out of seven are killed.
2.

Trucks account for more than one quarter of the accident
vehicles.

Seventeen percent of ell vehicles Involved in

accidents have evidence of oechanical defects.

The pos-

sibility of the driver hearing a warning bell or train whistle
is reduced because the windows are closed on most vehicles.

The

majority of accident; occur ct relatively low car speeds and at
moderate train speeds.
3.

Most accidents occur during the favorable driving conditions of
clear weather, daylight hours, and dry pavccentSo
n-^JEbar

of accidents per unit

tiave

However, the

and per unit exposure is

probably greater Jjt ice ivA anew conditions and for wet pave-

aouts than for dry paveasat conditions.
4*

The type of protection is not important 33 a variable in the
equations developed by regression analysis for tha prediction

of index of hazard.

.488
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5.

The regression equation developed by the anultlple linear rsgreasion technique (Equation 2) identifies

UUfflijttil'

of track pairs,

highway pavecent width, train volume, average daily traffic
volinsc, and tho sum of distractions '(number of houses, businesses,

and advertising signs) as important variables for the prediction

of index of hazard.

This equation explains 13 percent of the

variation in accident occurrence.
6.

Warrants

for the installation of protective devices at rail-

higltway crossings, based on the current standard of protection

used in Indiana, are hazard indices of below 0.65 for reflectorizod crocsbucks, 0.65 to 0.20 for flashers, and above 0.30 for
gates.
7.

This Investigation of

c&any

roadway, railroad, traffic, and environ-

mental variables permitted only an explanation of approximately 20
percent of accident occurrence.

This finding lands support to the

conclusion of many authors that railroad-higfc/ay grade crossing

eccident3 ere predominantly the result of driver characteristics
and /or chance.
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